In mid-October, President Obama moved to raise the amount of credit extended to small businesses. If Congress approves his plan, the measures would enable community banks to borrow at low rates from the Treasury Department's Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). It would also raise loan caps on some Small Business Administration (SBA) programs. To pearl jewelry qualify, the banks would have to show how they would increase lending to small enterprises.

The relief could not come a moment too soon. The job-creation engine known as small business has been slammed, not only because of falling demand but also because the normal flow of financing has slowed to a trickle. Small enterprises have created two-thirds of all new jobs since 1994 and they employ more than half of all private-sector employees. (The SBA's definition of a small enterprise is "an independent business having fewer than 500 employees.") In pearl jewelry September, for the second straight month, they laid off more workers than mid-sized or large employers. Prior to August, small businesses had never been the biggest source of layoffs, according to employee payment and data firm ADP, which began tracking the figures in 2001. Meanwhile, the U.S. unemployment rate hit 9.8% in September, and many analysts expect unemployment to hit 10% or more before topping out.

Last month, a survey by the National Federation of Independent Business (NFIB) found that expansion plans for small enterprises were at a 35-year low. That's no surprise, given that their usual sources of borrowing--banks, government-secured financing, venture capitalists and credit cards--are far more limited than a couple of years ago. The good news is that some tentative signs of improvement are akoya pearl necklace  turning up. Interviews with Wharton experts, banking officials and spokespeople from small business development organizations suggest that this patchwork of finance sources, all battered by the current financial crisis, is inching back toward pre-recession lending levels.

Currency appreciation in emerging markets has been particularly strong this year both because of external conditions--including high liquidity, a weak U.S. dollar and strong risk appetite--and domestic factors such as strong fundamentals, high potential growth and wider interest rates differentials. With sterling silver jewelry portfolio investments to emerging market (EM) countries also rising, policymakers need to figure out how to avoid losing international competitiveness while also containing asset inflation and the emergence of asset bubbles. So far this year, most countries have opted for or maintained either verbal intervention or reserves accumulation. Others have kept or chosen more aggressive administrative measures, including capital controls mostly targeting portfolio investments rather than FDI.

The imposition of capital controls on capital inflows as well as currency intervention tends to button pearl be ineffective in reversing the appreciating trend of the local currencies, especially if the latter are primarily driven by external factors. However, capital controls may be helpful in easing volatility and the pace of the trend itself. The risk is that capital controls are seen as punitive measures against capital markets. They raise uncertainty about future policy actions, hurt the credibility of the central bank and increase the costs of external funding for local businesses. Overall, policymakers' actions to contain the appreciating trend of their countries' currencies depend on how fast capital is flowing in, sterilization costs, and monetary policy flexibility. Consequently, EM countries where currencies and equity markets have surged over the course of the year are the most likely to impose some sort of limitations on capital inflows.

On Oct. 20, Brazil surprised investors with a 2% tax on capital inflows to both equity and bond markets. Likewise, in March 2008, Brazil used a 1.5% tax on fixed income inflows only to contain the Brazilian real's appreciation at the time. The tax was eventually lifted in October 2008 shortly after the Lehman Brothers  ( LEHMQ -  news  -  people ) collapse. This time around, taxation on wholesale coral jewelry  equity investment was included to contain short-term capital flows, while FDI was exempted. Although emerging-market currencies may continue to strengthen against the U.S. dollar, other EM policymakers may be more reluctant than Brazil's to introduce capital controls in an effort to stem the currency appreciation and protect exporters. Below we examine how countries have been dealing with strong capital inflows and which country, if any, is likely to be the first to follow Brazil.

The topic of executive compensation has once again hit the front pages, and with more heat than light. Adding fuel to the fire is the return of profitability of major banks, whose lavish pay scales at the top make ordinary people (and not a few professors) drool with envy. So we face this challenge. How exactly can regulators constrain pay without wrecking the entire financial sector?

I suspect that no collective mandate can do the job, either by controlling the mix of present and deferred benefits, or by imposing hard wage caps. Economist turned populist Ben Bernanke has a better idea. He thinks he can remove one set of imperfections from the executive compensation market without creating a second set. I have already expressed my doubt on this score. Alas, it is time to do it again.

Start with Bernanke's critique: "Compensation practices at some banking organizations have led to misaligned incentives and excessive risk-taking, contributing to bank losses and financial instability." Then comes the punch line: "The Federal Reserve is working to ensure that compensation packages appropriately tie rewards to round pearl longer-term performance and do not create undue risk for the firm or the financial system."

The first sentence has some truth; the second is the pie-in-the-sky. Wherein lies the disconnect? Start with the innocent word, "some." Some lies somewhere between all and none. That covers a lot of territory, but it does answer two pesky questions: How many banks? And which ones? Answering the first question gives some hint as to whether it pays for the Federal Reserve to gear up its oversight campaign. If some means two or three, Bernanke and company are on a fool's errand. Yet if the number of badly run banks is 10 or 12 , the "which" question comes to the fore. Who in government has reliable and timely information to distinguish banks with defective compensation programs that worked from those with sound executive compensation programs that were overwhelmed by external events? Probably no one.

The requisite information is hard to gather, especially at a distance. Past track record won't tell a lot, especially if the management team has turned over in the interim. Poring over quarterly reports just places a premium on stale information of no relevance in evaluating an individual employee's future performance. Bernanke's fledgling bureaucrats have only a snowball's chance in hell of isolating either delinquent firms or incompetent employees.

Just for fun, now suppose that the multi-strand necklaces  Fed's sleuths find the true offenders. Now how do they "ensure" that appropriate compensation programs are in place? First, do the Fed's operatives even know what an appropriate compensation program for key employees looks like? This is a tall order with many moving parts. The common suggestion, that the firm defer payment to see how the employee's early bets turn out, won't do the job. If the deferred payments are fixed, they won't vary with future performance, so why wait? And if they do vary, they could rise or fall on the backs of others long after their departure. How can any regulator divine the right mix?

You do the math: at present 28 banks are in line for a Fed redo, with, say, 100 top employees each. Can the Fed oversee 2,800 multi-year compensation packages in a timely and accurate fashion, when its own intervention is likely to increase corporate uncertainty and turnover? Yet Bernanke speaks only of regulatory success, never regulatory error, which could bring down the institutions he is supposed to save.

For his part, Ken Feinberg, the TARP czar, has the 175 top employees at the seven large TARP corporations in his crosshairs. The public wants a strong say in the operation of large firms rescued with tax dollars. Yet just how should this government investor behave in face of an acute conflict of interest? If Feinberg cares about the share value of a firm in which the U.S. has taken an equity stake, he should behave like a prudent investor. His proper course of action is to acquiesce in any and all lavish compensation packages that he believes will maximize shareholder value. If he cares about political blowback, he must defuse the populist outcry that those hefty compensation packages generate. Well, which is it? Feinberg can't do both at the same time. Rather than try, he should seek to minimize his role, not flex his muscles.

It is not exactly news that no one thinks it is a good idea in principle to cultured pearl jewelry let unsuccessful executives reap huge rewards from the companies that they have failed. Unfortunately, the hard matters deal with means, not ends. On those Mssrs. Bernanke and Feinberg sound adamant but clueless. Perhaps it's because politically they are in an enviable position. If the regulated firms mend, our regulators take the credit. If they fail, it proves that additional powers are needed.

To this libertarian, this blind faith flies in the face of experience. The operative norm should be that businesses are imperfect and governments are worse. Accordingly, the lesser (and cheaper) evil is for government to let firms set compensation levels. It is better for our high-profile experts to do nothing than to do something dumb. So into today's political climate, expect something dumb.